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1. Introduction 
In	1816	Antonio	Canova	famously	refused	to	restore	the	fragmen-
tary	Parthenon	Frieze	Lord	Elgin	had	recently	brought	to	England.	
In	an	attempt	to	have	the	statues	and	bas-reliefs	retouched,	Lord	
Elgin	went	 to	 Rome	to	 consult	with	 the	 renowned	artist,	 but	 Ca-
nova	flatly	declined.	After	examining	the	samples	and	acquainting	
himself	with	the	entire	collection,	he	declared	that	however	badly	
these	 statues	 had	suffered	 from	time	 and	barbarism,	 no	 one,	 not	
even	he,	could	improve	on	the	style	of	the	original	artist.	“It	would	
be	sacrilege	in	him	or	any	man	to	presume	to	touch	them	with	a	
chisel”,	he	claimed.	Canova’s	reaction	went	against	the	convention	
of	fully	restoring	antique	sculptures	prevailing	at	the	time.	His	re-
fusal	was	based	on	two	fundamental	principles:	on	the	one	hand,	
the	necessity	to	preserve	the	authentic	work	of	art	by	maintaining	
the	 aura	 of	 the	 artist’s	 authorship,	 whose	 mastery	 “testified	 the	
perfection	 to	 which	 art	 had	 advanced	 under	 Phidias	 among	 the	
ancients”1;	on	the	other,	the	acceptance	of	damage	incurred	since	
the	 work’s	 conception,	 inasmuch	 as	 physical	 evidence	 of	 the	
work’s	history	conveys	its	authenticity.		
In	 that	 same	 year,	 the	 Danish	 sculptor	 and	 collector	 Bertel	
Thorvaldsen	 completely	 restored	 the	 sculptures	 of	 the	 pediment	
of	the	Temple of Aphaia	at	Aegina	(Greece),	now	belonging	to	the	
Glyptothek	 in	 Munich,	 including	 the	 addition	 of	 modern	 replace-
ments	 of	 heads,	 drapery	 and	 armor,	 and	 completion	 of	 missing	
sections.	 Thorvaldsen	 did	 his	 job	 very	 thoroughly;	 to	 be	 sure,	
when	 one	 looks	 at	 the	 final	 result,	 the	 differences	 between	 the	
Neoclassical	style,	belonging	to	the	restorer’s	era,	and	the	original	
style	of	 the	 sculptures	are	 no	 immediately	apparent,	but	 the	 dis-
                                                 
1	Quoted	in:	Griffiths	(1811,	277).	
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tance	 between	 creation	 and	 reconstitution	 is	 tangible	 neverthe-
less.	As	early	as	the	late	19th	century,	these	restorations	were	the	
subject	 of	 much	 controversy	 and	 were	 finally	 removed	 between	
1963	 and	 1965,	 with	 a	 few	 critics	 arguing	 that	 the	 deletion	 of	
Thorvaldsen’s	 additions	 sacrificed	 a	 nineteenth-century	 complex	
Gesamtkunstwerk	for	the	sake	of	an	ancient	past.		
Canova	 and	 Thorvaldsen’s	 views	 exemplify	 opposing	 para-
digms	that	have	alternately	informed	restoration	theory	and	prac-
tice	since	its	19th	century	inception:	the	need	to	preserve	the	in-
tegrity	of	the	original	to	assure	the	work’s	authenticity	and	the	be-
lief	that	the	authenticity	of	a	work	is	not	established	once	and	for	
all	at	the	point	of	its	inception.	These	conflicting	perspectives	re-
call	a	famous	distinction	introduced	in	the	philosophical	debate	by	
Mark	Sagoff	(1978)	between	what	he	christened	integral and	pur-
ist approaches	 to	 art	 restoration.	 Roughly,	 the	 integral	 approach	
aims	to	restore	an	artwork	to	its	state	at	the	time	of	its	completion,	
even	if	doing	so	might	involve	adding	or	substituting	newly	fabri-
cated	components.	On	the	other	hand,	the	purist approach	rejects	
the	idea	that	the	object	should	be	repristinated	to	its	original	con-
ditions	and	allows	only	for	cleaning	of	the	original	work	and	reat-
tachment	of	components	that	might	have	fallen	off.		
In	this	paper,	I	argue	that	each	of	these	approaches	is	based	
(and	 I	 refer	 to	 Ami	 Harbin	 2008,	 on	 this)	 on	 a	 peculiar	 under-
standing	 of	 authenticity	 as	 either	 a	 ‘static’	 or	 a	 ‘dynamic’	 notion	
and	 invokes	 a	 different	 answer	 to	 the	 familiar	 philosophical	 dis-
pute	 on	 what	 an	 artwork	 is	 ontologically.	 However,	 both	 para-
digms	 prove	 to	 be	 defective	 in	 terms	 of	 restoration.	 They	 may,	
however,	give	us	insights	into	how	different	restoration	narratives	
and	ethics	can	be	re-configured	in	conceptual	terms.	
 
2. Authenticity in conservation/restoration 
Works	 of	 art	 are	 (among	 many	 other	 things)	 pieces	 of	 material	
testimony.	They	are	fragments	of	the	puzzle	that	is	art	history,	and	
actors	as	much	as	witnesses.	To	fight	against	artworks’	inevitable	
material	degradation,	preservation	science,	through	conservation	
and	restoration,	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 their	 up-keep.	 Conservation	 aims	
to	prevent	damage	to	a	piece,	and	to	reinforce	it	for	the	future;	it	
safeguards	the	object	in	its	current	state	by	stabilizing	it	and	pre-
serving	its	 integrity.	Restoration	actually	alters	the	physical	state	
of	 a	 work	 by	 rebuilding,	 repairing,	 repainting,	 or	 generally	 re-
perfecting	 it,	 the	 main	 ambition	 being	 to	 restore	 the	 piece	 to	 its	
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ideal	 state2.	 Restauration	 is	 thus	 much	 more	 controversial	 than	
conservation.	If	the	distinction	between	natural	aging	and	damage	
isn’t	vague,	 it	 is	absolutely	unclear	what	the	 ideal	state	of	an	art-
work	can	be.	The	complexity	of	the	matter	explains	why	a	consen-
sus	on	an	all-embracing	definition	of	restoration	has	not	yet	been	
reached.	As	conservators	Richmond	and	Bracker	(2009)	claim,	the	
past	 few	 decades	 have	 indeed	 witnessed	 increasing	 discomfort	
within	 the	profession	with	what	appears	to	be	a	 lack	of	rigorous	
self-analysis:	 conservation	 today	 needs	 to	 re-evaluate	 itself	 and	
acknowledge	 its	 need	 to	 engage	 in	 greater	 intellectual	 dialogue	
outside	of	the	profession3.	
Out	of	the	many	theoretical	questions	that	arise	after	a	more	
thorough	 consideration	 of	 restoration	 (questions	 of	 ethics	 and	
aesthetics,	 as	 well	 as	 more	 specific	 notions	 on	 the	 identity	 of	
works	of	art),	I	want	to	focus	here	on	one	particular	philosophical	
issue	 par excellence.	 My	 question	 is	 simple	 yet	 the	 answer	 isn’t:	
How	are	we	to	understand	authenticity	from	the	point	of	view	of	
preservation	 theory?	 Any	 attempt	 to	 answer	 this	 question	 re-
quires	 consideration	 of	 the	 scope	 and	 purpose	 of	 restora-
tion/conservation	as	well	as	a	practical	understanding	of	the	sig-
nificance	of	‘authenticity’;	what	it	means	to	restorers,	artists,	and	
society	as	a	whole.	
 
2.1 Authenticity: Static or Dynamic? 
Authenticity	is	a	central	philosophical	notion.	We	find	reference	to	
‘authenticity’,	 ‘being	authentic	 to	 oneself’,	 ‘living	authentically’	 in	
ethics	 and	 political	 philosophy	 throughout	 the	 entire	 history	 of	
thought:	 from	 ancient	 Greece,	 throughout	 the	 Enlightenment,	 to	
existentialists	 and	 contemporary	 social	 theorists.	 Although	 these	
views	on	authenticity	vary,	a	common	theme	is	that	authenticity	is	
an	 ideal	 that	 does	 not	 admit	 of	 degrees:	 either	 something	 is	 au-
thentic	or	it	 is	not.	This	explains	why	many	of	the	discussions	on	
authenticity	in	the	philosophy	of	art	have	been	centered	on	an	ei-
ther/or polarization	 around	 the	 notions	 of	authentic/inauthentic,	
original/fake,	 genuine/deceptive,	 true/false,	 real/counterfeit.	
Within	 the	 world	 of	 traditional	 fine	 art	 objects	 to	 say	 that	 some-
                                                 
2	After	the	15th	Triennial	Conference	held	in	September	2008, the	International	Council	
of	Museums	Committee	of	Conservation	(ICOM-CC)	adopted	a	resolution	on	a	terminol-
ogy	 which	 defines	 the	 term	 ‘restoration’	 as	 a	 part	 of	 conservation	 (see:	
http://www.icom-cc.org/242/about/terminology-for-conservation).	
3	Cf.	with:	Richmond	&	Bracker	(2009,	15).	
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thing	 is	 authentic	 is	 to	 say	 that	 it	 is	 what	 it	 professes	 to	 be,	 or	
what	it	is	reputed	to	be,	in	origin	or	authorship,	with	no	room	for	
uncertainty.	Authentic	objects	hold	within	them	material	evidence	
that	causally	relates	 them	back	to	 the	hand	of	 the	author.	 In	this	
sense,	they	provide	us	with	a	direct	link	to	a	particular	past.	Many	
have	 therefore	 argued	 that	 authenticity	 is	 prerequisite	 for	 our	
aesthetic	appreciation	to come	about	in	the	first	place4.	An	incor-
rect presumption	 or	 discovery	 of	 mistake	 reduces	 the	 aesthetic	
impact	of	the	object	or	even	jeopardises	the	experience	altogether.		
The	 relevance	 of	 judgment	 of	 authenticity	 for	 aesthetic	 ex-
perience	 is	explored	for	example	by	Mark	Sagoff	(1978)	who	be-
lieves	 authenticity	 to	 be	 a	 necessary condition for	 the	 correct	 ap-
prehension	of	a	piece	of	art:	«I	wish	to	suggest	that	authenticity	is	
a	necessary	condition	of	aesthetic	value.	One	cannot	appreciate	a	
work	of	art	simply	for	the	sake	of	its	appearance	or	for	the	feelings	
it	 induces:	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 object	 is	 crucial	 to	 its	 value;	 one	
must	appreciate	 the	work	 itself.»	(Sagoff	1978,	453)	Establishing	
the	authenticity	of	a	work	of	art,	according	to	Sagoff,	is	to	consider	
it	 unique,	 and	 this	 feature	 of	 uniqueness	 is	 essential	 to	 aesthetic	
appreciation,	since	the	aesthetic	value	and	significance	of	a	work	
of	 art	 can	 only	 be	 assessed	 if	 its	 authenticity	 has	 been	 correctly	
determined.	
But	 how	 do	 we	 determine	 authenticity?	 Of	 course,	 the	 first	
step	is	to	study	the	history	of	the	object	and	to	identify	its	creator	
and	provenance,	what	Dutton	calls	the	object’s	nominal authentici-
ty (Dutton	2003,	327).	 Identifying	a	work’s	‘nominal	authenticity’	
involves	making	sense	of	it	according	to	what	he	calls	its	original	
‘canon	of	criticism’:	«What	did	it	mean	to	its	creator?	How	was	it	
related	to	the	cultural	context	of	its	creation?	To	what	established	
genre	 did	 it	 belong?	 What	 could	 its	 original	 audience	 have	 been	
expected	to	make	of	it?	What	would	they	have	found	engaging	or	
important	about	it?»	(Dutton	2003,	327).	
Nominal	authenticity	–	what	is	usually	referred	to	as	prove-
nance	–	may	be	impossible	to	determine	in	many	cases,	but	where	
it	is	possible,	Dutton	claims,	it	is	a	plain	empirical	discovery,	hav-
ing	to	do	with	‘cut-and-dried	fact’	(Dutton	2003,	336).	A	conserva-
tor	might	be	able	to	draw	upon	precise	scientific	analysis	to	estab-
lish	 that	 a	 particular	 object	 is	 authentic.	 Procedures	 used	 to	 au-
thenticate	 objects	 can	 concentrate	 for	 instance	 on	 the	 identifica-
                                                 
4	See	 Sagoff	 (1978;	 2014);	 Levinson	 (1987);	 Taylor	 (1989);	 Farrelly-Jackson	 (1997);	
Korsmeyer	(2008);		on	this.	
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tion	of	materials,	the	examination	of	tool	marks	and	other	features	
of	construction,	and	the	use	of	dating	techniques.	Nominal	authen-
ticity	can	in	this	sense	be	determined	as	a	matter	of	scientific	pre-
cision.	 The	 issue,	 however,	 may	 be	 more	 philosophically	 conten-
tious	than	that.		
One	 central	 problem	 is	 for	 instance	 whether	 nominal	 au-
thenticity	is	fully	established	in	the	process	of	the	act	of	creation,	
namely,	 at	 the	 work’s	 initial	 point	 of	 existence.	 Our	 response	 to	
this	question	greatly	influence	which	theory	of	restoration	we	are	
apt	to.	
(1)	 If	 our	 answer	 is	 affirmative	 we	commit	 to	 the	 idea	 that	
authenticity	 is	 totally	 determined	 by	 the	 work’s	 creator.	 An	 art-
work’s	 development	 finishes	 when	 the	 creative	 act	 is	 completed.	
But	given	that	–	after	this	initial	point	of	existence	–	its	identity	is	
constantly	 threatened	 over	 time,	 as	 it	 is	 subjected	 to	 wear	 or	
damage,	our	 job	is	to	do	our	best	to	preserve	 its	original	state	 in	
the	 midst	 of	 potentially	 dangerous	 external	 influences.	 This	 un-
derlies	 a	 peculiar	 conception	 concerning	 the	 temporality	 of	 the	
artwork.	The	technical	and	contextual	 features	of	an	artwork	are	
authentic	 insofar	as	 they	remain	constant,	 that	 is,	 insofar	as	 they	
can	ensure	its	unique	nature.	Authenticity	is	thus	taken	to	be,	so	to	
say,	 a	 universal	given,	 exempt	 from	historical	 flux;	after	 its	 crea-
tion	the	authenticity	of	an	artwork	remains static.	
(2)	If	our	answer	is	negative	we	commit	to	the	view	that	au-
thenticity	 is	 something	 that	 ties	 initial	 creation	 and temporal	
changes	 together.	 The	 social	 and	 historical	 context	 in	 which	 an	
artwork	is	created	is	expanded,	so	to	say,	so	as	to	include	the	en-
tire	duration	of	the	artwork’s	existence.	As	long	as	the	artwork	ex-
ists,	from	this	point	of	view,	its	authenticity	is	dynamic	and	subject	
to	an	ongoing	process	of	development.	In	this	sense,	damage	and	
change	are	elements	that	confirm	authenticity	more	than	threaten	
it.	They	are	evidence	of	the	work’s	history	and	can	be	thought	of	
as	significant	parts	of	its	 ‘life’,	crucial	components	of	its	historici-
ty5.	
	
 
 
                                                 
5	Modern	approach	and	opinion	on	the	subject	would	seem	to	promote	 the	 latter	posi-
tion.	The	Venice	Charter,	for	example,	establishes	an	approach	to	restoration	that	is	con-
cerned	with	the	living	history	of	the	artwork.	This	living	history	is	protected	as	witness-
ing	the	artwork’s	authenticity.	However,	the	alternative	view	has	not	died	out.		
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3. A question of metaphysics 
Choosing	between	(1)	and	(2)	is	a	question	of	metaphysics,	since	
our	conception	of	authenticity	depends	directly	on	the	ontological	
framework	in	which	an	art	object	is	classified:	should	the	ontolog-
ical	framework	shift,	then	so	too	should	our	concept	of	authentici-
ty	 (Laurenson	 2006).	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 we	 have	 something,	 a	
substance,	 that	 remains	 the	 same	 entity	 though	 its	 properties	
have	changed,	so	we	need	a	way	of	identifying	that	selfsame	thing	
which	 has	 changed,	 for	 otherwise	 speaking	 of	 change	 would	 be	
impossible.	Determining	this	ontological	 issue	is	crucial	 if	we	are	
to	understand	the	precise	nature	of	an	artwork’s	authenticity. 
By	 considering	 an	 artwork’s	 authenticity	 as	 ultimately	 de-
fined	 at	 the	 point	 of	 creation,	 we	 are	 reducing	 the	 notion	 of	 art-
work	 to	 the	 physical	 object	 it	 is,	 namely,	 to	 the	 ‘configured-and-
conditioned’	object	(Levinson	1989,	279)	it	is	composed	of,	whose	
parts	have	been	structured	in	a	certain	unique	way	by	the	original	
artist.	The	work-identity is	 regarded	as	 coextensive	 to	 the	 object-
identity,	and	consequently	all	changes	in	the	physical	structure	of	
the	 object	 are	 considered	 potential	 damage	 to	 the	 persistence	 of	
the	work6.	Gradual	alteration	over	time	to	this	 is	thus	seen	as	an	
unwelcome	and	hopefully	avoidable	threat.	
Conversely,	 in	 taking	 the	 artwork’s	 authenticity	 as	 time-re-
sistant,	we	are	leaning	towards	regarding	an	artwork	as	a	histori-
cal being.	 Though	 we	 may	 acknowledge	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	
work’s	origins,	 we	also	 accept	 its	extended,	 ongoing,	 temporality	
as	 essential	 to	 its	 identity.	 Taken	 as	 a	 ‘living	 individual’,	 an	 art-
work	can	be	seen	as	experiencing	change	and	alteration	as	part	of	
its	normal	life.	The	same	plant	is	first	just	a	small	one,	then	grows	
to	maturity,	and	then	declines:	yet,	 its	identity	 is	not	 jeopardized	
by	 these	 changes7.	 Beginning	 with	 its	 creation	 and	 the	 elements	
                                                 
6	This	position	can	be	thought	of	as	consistent	with	what	Wollheim	famously	called	the	
‘physical	 object	 hypothesis’:	 “This	 theory	 is	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 in	 those	 arts	 where	 the	
work	of	art	is	an	individual,	i.e.	painting,	carved	sculpture,	and	possibly	architecture	[…]	
the	work	of	art	is	really	identical	with	or	is	merely	constitutively	identical	with	or	made	
of	the	same	stuff	as,	some	physical	object”	(Wollheim	1980,	177).	
7	Guy	Rohrbaugh	has	 famously	proposed	a	 sympathetic	account,	 based	 on	 the	 recogni-
tion	of	three	fundamental	features	that	artworks	share	(modal	flexibility;	temporal	flex-
ibility;	temporality).	“To	put	it	crudely”,	Rohrbaugh	states,	“instead	of	thinking	of	a	work	
of	art	as	identical	to	a	certain	form	or	structure,	we	should	think	of	artworks	as	objects in 
and persisting through history,	ones	which	merely	have	a	certain	form”	since,	“all	of	these	
things	come	into	and	go	out	of	existence,	change,	interact	with	other	historical	individu-
als,	 and	 could	 have	 been	 otherwise	 had	 their	 histories	 gone	 differently”	 (Rohrbaugh	
2003,	178-9	emphasis added).	
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that	 went	 into	 establishing	 its	 nominal	 authenticity	 (e.g.,	 tech-
niques	of	the	era,	the	artist	or	the	geographical	sources	of	the	ma-
terials	used),	the	life	of	the	artwork	extends	over	time.	It	is	in	this	
sense	 like	 an	 organism	 which	 changes	 as	 it	 matures	 and	 whose	
identity	is	distinguished	in	essence	from	the	physical	material	it	is	
made	of.		
Notice	that	opposing	interpretations	of	an	artwork’s	identity	
impinge	directly	on	conceptions	of	its	authenticity;	and	the	way	in	
which	an	artwork	is	treated	by	the	social	and	aesthetic	community	
–	including	interventions	of	conservation	and	restoration	–	differs	
significantly	according	to	how	its	authenticity	is	viewed.	
If	we	defend	(1)	we	opt	for	what	I	have	referred	to	as	‘Thor-
valdsen’s	 paradigm’.	 The	 authenticity	 of	 the	 work	 is	 seen	 in	 this	
view	as	ultimately	defined	at	the	point	of	creation,	thus	concerted	
effort	is	made	to	restore	what	is	perceived	to	be	the	original	aes-
thetic	 nature	 of	 the	 material	 object.	 Since	 the	 artwork	 coincides	
with	the	object	it	is,	the	only	way	to	preserve	it	is	by	reestablish-
ing	 its	original	 features,	bringing	 it	back	to	 the	way	 it	was	at	 the	
time	of	creation.	This	involves	imagining	artworks	as	they	were	at	
the	 time	 of	 completion,	 as	 if	 we	 could	 step	 into	 a	 time	 machine;	
philosophically,	it	draws	on	the	idealistic	idea	that	artworks	are	a-
temporal	entities,	only	contingently	related	to	the	material	objects	
that	 constitute	 them,	 something	 outside	 of	 reality,	 like	 Platonic	
forms	 (Carrier	 2009).	 Restorers	 who	 endorse	 this	 ‘integral’	 ap-
proach	are	prone	to	take	on	the	role	of	the	artist.	However,	while	
trying	to	return	a	 work	to	 its	original	condition,	 they	may	create	
an	 actual	 historical	 falsification.	 For	 example,	 in	 rebuilding	 parts	
of	 the	 Aphaia Temple,	 Thorvaldsen	 merged	 the	 old	 and	 the	 new	
and	ended	up	producing	an	overall	sensation	of	falsity.	This	type	
of	restoration	can	therefore	diminish	a	work’s	authenticity	rather	
than	preserve	it.	
If	we	defend	(2)	we	go	along	with	Canova	in	favor	of	the	con-
servation	of	the	current	status quo	of	the	work.	When	authenticity	
is	understood	as	including	the	whole	‘life’	of	a	work,	artworks	are	
regarded	 as	 historical	 documents	 whose	 value	 resides	 primarily	
in	 the	 age:	 the	 greater	 the	 age,	 the	 greater	 the	 value,	 the	 greater	
the	 authenticity.	 Interventions	 are	 therefore	 aimed	at	 preserving	
what	 remains,	 limiting	 actions	 to	 the	 avoidance	 of	 deterioration.	
However,	 this	 ‘purist’	 approach	 seems	 only	 viable	 in	 the	 case	 of	
archeological	 artifacts	 and	 ancient	 works	 of	 art	 such	 as	 the	 Par-
thenon	 Frieze.	 It	 can	 hardly	 apply	 to	 other	 works	 of	 art.	 Indeed,	
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we	cannot	always	view	a	work	of	art	as	if	it	were	a	document,	an	
occurrence	 in	 history.	 More	 than	 simply	 vestiges	 from	 the	 past,	
artworks	are	also	and	primarily	objects	of	aesthetic	appreciation	–	
and	it	is	the	aim	of	restoration	to	preserve	this	aesthetic	characte-
ristic8. 
	
4. Problems with the two paradigms 
Are	we	really	forced	to	choose	between	either	completely	restor-
ing	 an	 artwork	 to	 enhance	 its	 aesthetic	 value	 (whereby	 compro-
mising	 its	 documental	 character)	 or	 maintaining	 it	 in	 its	 status	
quo	 to	 preserve	 its	 historic	 value	 (thus	 threatening	 its	 aesthetic	
worth)?	Neither	of	these	options	seems	intuitively	convincing.			
One	way	to	make	sense	to	this	intuition	is	to	reconsider	the	
two	approaches	in	the	light	of	the	distinction,	formerly	introduced	
by	Cesare	Brandi	(2005),	between	what	he	calls	the	istanza esteti-
ca	(‘aesthetic	 case’	 or	 ‘aesthetic	 demand’)	 and	 the	 istanza stori-
ca (i.e.,	roughly,	the	historical	value	of	the	artwork).		
Brandi	 argues	 that	 the	 work	 of	 art	 always	 offers	 itself	 in	 a	
twofold	way.	It	has	an	impact	on	the	viewer	both	as	an	artistic	ex-
emplar,	 with	 unique	 aesthetic	 features	 and	 properties,	 and	 as	 a	
historical	document	of	human	history.	He	considers	aesthetic	val-
ue	 to	 be	 the	 most	 important	 criterion	 for	 conservation	 in	 most	
cases:	when	the	signs	of	time	on	a	given	piece	of	art	compromise	
its	aesthetic	value	and	appreciation	they	must	indeed	be	removed	
in	 the	 conservation	 process:	 «if	 the	 addition	 disturbs,	 perverts,	
conceals	or	hides	the	artwork	to	some	extent,	 it	 is	clear	that	this	
addition	must	be	removed»	(Brandi	2005,	73).	However,	aesthetic	
demands	 need	not	 always	prevail.	 The	historical	 value may	often	
take	precedence:	it	is	the	conservator,	or	the	decision-maker,	who	
needs	to	make	a	value	judgement	about	the	prevalence	of	one	case 
over	another	(Brandi	2005,	74).		
This	 explains	 why,	 according	 to	 Brandi,	 arguments	 for	 pre-
serving	 either	 the	 aesthetic	 value	 of	 an	 object	 –	 as	 in	 Thorvald-
sen’s	integral	restoration	model	–		or	its	age	–	as	in	Canova’s	pur-
ist	approach	–		are	ultimately	inconclusive.	No	available	evidence	
shows	 that	 any	 of	 these	 procedures	 is	 correct.	 In	 fact,	 that	 be-
tween	historic	value	and	aesthetic	value	is	a	false	alternative.	Try-
ing	to	find	a	balance	between	the	two	demands	is	instead	the	cru-
cial	 aim	 of	 preservation	 science:	«The	 relationship	 between	 both	
                                                 
8	This	was	famously	foreseen	by	Alois	Riegl	(1903).	
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cases represents	the	dialectics	of	conservation»	(Brandi	2005,	50)	,	
and	the	‘two-fold	nature	of	artworks’	must	never	be	overlooked.		
But	problems	also	arise	when	examining	the	paradigms	from	
an	 ontological	 perspective.	 Although	 it	 may	 be	 appealing	 to	 con-
sider	works	of	art	like	simple	physical	objects	or	individual	living	
beings,	 the	 analogy	 is	 in	 both	 cases	 not	 tenable	 metaphysically	
speaking.	In	the	first	place,	while	physical	objects	survive	the	gra-
dual	replacement	of	their	original	parts,	artworks	do	not.	A	com-
puter	 is	 the	 same	 object	 though	 its	 original	 components	 may	 be	
gradually	 replaced	 as	 they	 deteriorate;	 an	 artwork,	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	does	not	survive	replacement	of	its	original	parts.	If	a	paint-
ing	is	constantly	repainted	so	that	in	the	end	nothing	of	the	origi-
nal	varnish	is	left,	the	artwork	has	not	survived,	although	the	orig-
inal	picture	might	in	fact	have.		
In	the	second	place,	though	there	is	certainly	something	ap-
pealing	about	the	idea	of	works	of	art	being	like	individual	 living	
beings9,		artworks	do	not	contain	an	intrinsic	plan	of	development,	
do	not	age	according	to	a	‘genetic’	design,	as	natural	organisms	do.	
In	other	words,	they	do	not	share	a	common	physis which	brings	
with	it	a	«settled	single-track	pattern	of	coming	to	be,	maturation	
and	passing	 away»	(Wiggins	 2012,	 10).	Aristotle	 has	 an	 effective	
way	of	stating	this:	the	term	‘nature’	he	claims,	cannot	be	referred	
to	artifacts,	since	 ‘nature’	refers	 to	 the	 inner	source	of	cause	and	
change,	 while	 artifacts,	 apart	 from	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 matter	 that	
composes	 them,	 lack	 inner	 principles	 of	 change	 and	 rest	 (Meta-
physics	192b13-23).		
 
4.1 Artworks as social objects 
Within	 the	 range	 of	 options	 conventionally	 considered	 by	 meta-
physicians,	a	more	promising	one	may	be	to	consider	artworks	as	
social	 entities	 rather	 than	 physical	 objects	 or	 living	 beings.	 The	
notion	 of	 social object	notably	 comes	 from	 John	 Searle	
(1995),	who	 uses	 the	 term	 in	 the	 broadest	 possible	 sense	 to	 in-
clude	all	 individual	 things,	powers,	and	relations	that	depend	for	
their	very	existence	on	human	conventions,	practices,	institutions;	
basically,	 on	 collective	 intentionality.	 Artworks	 are	 social	 objects	
                                                 
9	We	actually	tend	to	think	about	works	of	art	as	being	infused	with	an	essential	human-
ness	or	spirit.	Cf.	with	Newman,	G.E.,	D.M.	Bartels	and	R.K.	Smith	(2014).	The	authors	of	
this	 recent	 empirical	 study	 argue	 that	 people’s	 reasoning	 about	 art	 persistence	 over	
time	is	related	to	judgments	about	the	persistence	of	individual	persons,	because	art	ob-
jects	are	seen	as	physical	extensions	of	their	creators.		
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in	the	sense	that	that	they	are	what	they	are	because	of	a	network	
of	conventions	that	determine	the	parameters	we	use	to	 identify	
them	(Binkley	1977,	259).	Even	so	(apparently)	simple	a	question	
as	what	a	painting	is	cannot	be	answered	without	reference	to	the	
conventions	of	depiction	which	have	been	adopted	by	a	particular	
society	 in	 a	 particular	 time.	 In	 this	network	of	conventions,	 each	
art	 form	 establishes	 criteria	 for	 identifying	 single	 artworks	 and	
appropriately	experiencing	their	aesthetic	qualities.		
More	 relevantly	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 restoration,	 as	 opposed	 to	
physical	objects,	social	entities	–	like	states,	institutions,	organiza-
tions	 –	 can	 survive	 change	 if	 there	 is	 sufficient	 continuity.	 Con-
temporary	Italy	is	the	same	country	it	was	under	the	rule	of	King	
Vittorio	Emanuele	II	in	1861,	though	it	is	now	a	democracy	and	its	
borders	 have	 changed	 somewhat,	 whereas	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 the	
Two	 Sicilies	 ceased	 to	 exist	 when	 it	 was	 incorporated	 into	 the	
Kingdom	of	Italy	and	the	last	Bourbon	king	was	deposed.	We	can	
say	that	only	in	the	first	case	 is	there	sufficient	continuity	 for	the	
object	 to	 have	 survived	 the	 radical	 changes	 it	 underwent.	 Let	 us	
grant,	for	the	sake	of	the	argument,	the	analogy	between	artworks	
and	social	objects:	this	leads	us	yet	to	the	question	as	to	how	we	
can	 measure	 artworks’	 continuity,	 and,	 especially,	 how	 we	 can	
preserve	it.	
 
5. Readability and the authenticity of the image 
One	possible	answer	is	that	gradual	deterioration	does	not	threat-
en	the	continuity	of	an	artwork’s	existence	as	 long	as	 its	original	
aesthetic	arrangement	is	still	readable.	In	this	sense,	the	main	aim	
of	restoration	would	be	to	(strive	to)	preserve	continuity	by	facili-
tating	the	‘readability’	of	artworks.	Indeed,	according	to	the	direc-
tor	of	the	Centre	de	Recherche	et	de	Restauration	des	Musées	de	
France,	 Jean-Pierre	 Mohen:	 «Readability	 is	 an	 extremely	 impor-
tant	 notion.	 It guarantees the authenticity of the artwork,	 its state 
of conservation and its capacity to transmit its aesthetic and cultur-
al message».10	Artworks’	authenticity	could	accordingly	be	under-
stood	in	terms	of	continuity	of	‘readability’.	However,	readability,	
as	 a	 criterion	 for	 restoration,	 seems	 particularly	 vague.	 How	 are	
we	to	understand	it?		
                                                 
10		From	Le Monde des Débats,	Sept.	2000,	quoted	in	Beck	(2001,	1):	«La	lisibilité	devient	
donc	une	notion	extrêmement	importante.	Elle	est	garante	de	la	part	de	l’authenticité	de	
l’œuvre,	de	son	état	de	conservation	et	de	sa	capacité	à	transmettre	son	message	esthé-
tique	et	culturel».	
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Again,	 we	 can	 gain	 some	 insight	 from	 reading	 Brandi’s	
Theory of Restoration.	 The	 artist,	 Brandi	 states,	 creates	 a	 certain	
material	 structure	 with	 a	 certain	 visible	 appearance	 to	 convey	
what	 he	 calls	 immagine,	 the	 image	 of	 the	 work.	 In	 the	 case	 of	an	
altarpiece,	the	wood	panel	 is	the	structure	whose	visible	appear-
ance	–	 the	picture	–	 transmits	(but	does	not	 coincide	with11)	 the	
work’s	image.	The	material	object	is	but	a	«vehicle	for	an	image’s	
epiphany»	(Brandi	2005,	51).	Unfortunately,	 the	Theory	offers	lit-
tle	 clarification	 as	 to	 the	 precise	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	 ‘image’:	 to	
understand	 it	 one	 should	refer	 to	 the	 philosophical	context	in	
which	 the	essay	was	 written	 –	 many	 of	 the	 notions	 used	 can	 be	
traced	back	to	existentialist	philosophy	–	and	read	other	works	by	
Brandi	 on	 aesthetics12.	 In	a	 nutshell,	 though,	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	
term	‘image’	epitomizes	not	only	the	 figurative	feature	of	a	work	
of	art,	namely,	its	representational	content,	but	also	the	phenome-
nological	perception	we	have	of	it.	The	image	is	what	really	needs	
to	be	maintained,	as	it	constitutes	the	essence	of	the	work,	name-
ly,	 the	result	of	 the	synthetic	act	 taking	place	 in	 the	artist’s	mind	
during	the	creative	process	and	then	externalized	into	a	material	
structure.	The	work’s	image,	thus,	exists	not	only	as	a	visible	enti-
ty,	but	as	an	element	of	our	perception	and	understanding.	In	light	
of	this,	we	can	argue	that	preserving	continuity	in	restoration	may	
consist	primarily	in	safeguarding	the	impact	the	work	has	on	our	
consciousness;	 that	 is,	 in	 keeping	 its	 image	 perceivable,	 unders-
tandable	and	appreciable	–	in	a	word,	readable.		
This	leads	us	to	re-consider	the	intuitive	assumption	that	the	
aim	 of	 restoration	 is	 to	 preserve	 the	 original	 material of	 an	 art-
work.	Indeed,	 it	seems	that	to	preserve	a	work’s	authenticity,	we	
must	preserve	its	image	readability,	which	is	not	the	same	thing	as	
preserving	the	physical	object	itself.	We	can	thus	formulate	a	fur-
ther	difference	between	the	authenticity	of	the	object	as	opposed	
to	 the	 authenticity	 of	 the	 image. Perhaps	 in	 the	 end	 authenticity	
does	not	actually	have	much	to	do	with	the	fact	that	a	given	physi-
cal	object	has	been	left	untouched	by	the slings and arrows of out-
rageous fortune.	Indeed,	authenticity	may	not	simply	lie	within	the	
physical	realm.	
                                                 
11The	appearance	can	roughly	be	defined	as	the	visible	feature	of	the	material.	
12	For	an	introduction	to	Brandi’s	aesthetics	and	philosophy	of	restoration	see	(in	Ital-
ian):	Catalano	(1998);	Carboni	(2004);	D’Angelo	(2006);	(in	English):	Rockwell	(2005);	
Matero	(2007).		
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One	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 way	 we	 perceive	 art	 objects	
depends	on	our	experience	of	other	art	 that	 the	artist	or	her/his	
coevals	 could	 never	 know	 (see:	 Carrier	 2009,	 205).	 In	 order	 to	
view	a	17th	century	painting	unchanged,	we	would	have	to	know	
how	 an	 educated	 audience	 of	 the	 time	 would	 have	 perceived	 it,	
learn	 much	 which	 they	 would	 have	 found	 obvious,	 and	 forget	 in	
the	meanwhile	what	we	know	about	later	art	history.	Another	re-
lated	reason	 is	 that	changes	 in	context	can	change	how	 we	see	a	
work.	 When	 an	 altarpiece	 is	 moved	 from	 a	 church	 to	 a	 museum	
and	placed	near	modern	secular	art,	 it	 looks	different.	Its	context	
has	 changed:	 people	 no	 longer	 pray	 before	 it.	 Its	 function	 has	
changed	too:	it	has	become	a	work	of	art.	The	material	object	may	
have	survived,	but	in	the	new	site	it	now	looks	and	is	looked	at	in	
a	different	way.	Its	image	has	thus	been	altered.	But	if	changes	in	
evaluation,	 context,	and	 function	have	such	a	 strong	 impact	 on	 a	
work’s	identity,	it	follows	that	most	attempts	to	safeguard	authen-
ticity	 solely	 by	 safeguarding	 the	 original	 physical	 object	 (for	 ex-
ample	 by	 musealizing	 the	 art	 piece)	 are	 condemned	 to	 failure	 a 
priori.		
	
6. Authenticity revised 
These	considerations	urge	us	to	broaden	our	notion	of	authentici-
ty	beyond	the	mere	 ‘material	structure’	of	 the	physical	object,	so	
as	to	include	contextual,	functional	and	evaluative	aspects	among	
the	relevant	factors	that	contribute	to	make	a	work’s	authentic.	A	
diagram	 proposed	 by	 art	 conservator	 Jonathan	 Kemp	 (2009)	
might	be	useful	in	this	regard.	Kemp’s	thesis	is	that	every	work	of	
art	can	be	hypothetically	plotted	at	any	given	time	between	three	
temporal	 axes,	 where	 each	 axis	 describes	 variables	 stemming	
from	 an	 (ideal)	 ‘ground	 zero’	 of	 an	 object’s	 origin.	 The	 z-axis	
represents	 significant	 change	 in	 an	 object’s	 function,	 the	 y-axis	
represents	change	in	how	the	object	is	interpreted	and	the	x-axis	
represents	change	in	the	original	materials.	
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The	point	of	this	diagram	is	to	show	that	sense	about	the	authen-
ticity	of	an	artwork	is	always	going	to	be:	«a	ride	along	a	trajecto-
ry	 from	which,	at	any	 one	point,	 the	object	will	have	stronger	or	
weaker	 genealogical	 links	 to	 its	 origins»	 (Kemp	 2009,	 65).	
Changes	in	multiple	axes	give	each	object	a	unique	topology,	with	
its	 boundaries	 closer	 or	 farther	 away	 from	 its	 ‘impossible-to-
return-to’	ground	zero.	When	art	objects	are	plotted	along	the	giv-
en	 axes,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 they	 don’t	 fit	 into	 the	 dichotomic 
categories	of	being	authentic	or	non-authentic.	
In	 many	 cases	 it	 is	 even	 doubtful	 whether	 one	 can	 identify	
any	particular	component	as	the	locus	of	authenticity	in	the	sense	
of	‘original	physical	object’.	Kemp	gives	us	the	example	of	a	panel	
of	stained	glass	in	a	medieval	cathedral.	There	is	very	little	origi-
nal	glass	and	even	 less	original	 lead,	because	«return	to	a	design	
that	 is	 known	 has	 been	 a	 regular	 conservation	 process	 until	 at	
least	 the	 1990s	 –	 yet	 can	 still	 be	 described	 as	 being	 authentic»	
(Kemp	2009,	64-65).		
Once	the	notion	of	authenticity	is	‘vectorized’	in	this	sense,	it	
becomes	more	evident	that	the	choices	conservators,	curators	and	
other	 stake-holders	 make	 always	 modify	 the	 coordinates	 of	 a	
work.	 Artworks	 indeed	 cannot	 maintain	 the	 same	 coordinates	
throughout	their	 lifetime,	since	their	topology	invariably	changes	
whenever	they	are	maintained	and	redisplayed.	Even	works	that	
remain	in	their	original	context	–	such	as	the	painted	glass	in	the	
cathedral	–	will	change	as	they	deteriorate	or	are	re-used	in	some	
way	in	the	future.	
The	suggestion	here	is	that	the	concept	of	authenticity	is	far	
more	complex	than	it	seems	to	be	for	any kind	of	artwork	(say,	for	
artworks	which	stay	in	their	original	location	as	well	as	for	those	
which	 enter	 in	 a	 museum	 collection	 etc.).	 This	 is	 essentially	 be-
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cause,	 as	 Kemp’s	 diagram	 helps	 us	 understand,	 all autographic	
works	 have	 an	 allographic	 component	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	
preservation	 theory.	 When	 the	 same	 piece	 of	 art	 is	 considered	
from	 two	 different	 moments	 in	 its	 history,	 each	 moment	 can	 be	
viewed,	to	a	certain	extent,	as	an	instance	of	the	work	plotted	by	a	
different	 topology	 in	 the	 diagram;	 this	 means	 that	 its	 qualities	
necessarily	differ	one	from	the	other,	yet	each	is	to	be	considered	
that	work	of	art.		
Hence,	we	had	better	look	at	the	philosophy	of	music	to	ex-
plore	 alternative	 ways	 of	 understanding	 authenticity	 that	 might	
be	 helpful	 to	 restoration.	 In	 this	 model	 authenticity	 admit	 of	 de-
grees	 (i.e.	 a	 performance	 can	 be	 more	 or	 less	 authentic)	 and	 is	
measured	 against	 the	 designation	 of	 work	 defining	 properties,	
properties,	 that	 is,	 that	are	 important	 to	 the	 identity	of	 the	work	
(which	leaves	room	for	 interpretation).	This	also	helps	us	switch	
the	focus	of	restoration	to	documentation,	the	use	of	which	–	just	
as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 allographic	 works	 of	 art	 –	 ensures	 multiple	 au-
thentic	instances	of	a	work.	Documentation,	whether	it	be	written	
reports,	 database	 entries,	 images,	 photographs	 or	 material	 evi-
dences,	 represents	 indeed	 an	 attempt	 to	 capture	 the	 work-
defining	properties.	The	fact	that	restoration’s	methodological	ef-
ficiency	must	rely	 on	 documentation	 is	 also	particularly	 relevant	
because	it	allows	for	the	complete	reversibility	of	any	intervention	
–	a	key	principle	in	today’s	preservation	ethics.	Any	material	evi-
dence	 of	 the	 changes	 made	 on	 a	 piece	 of	 art	 (removed,	 re-
perfected	 or	 re-arranged	 material	 etc.)	 must	 be	 archived	 and	
should	 always	 be	 accompanied	 by	 written	 documentation,	 since	
this	 serves	 «as	 a	 proof	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 art	 restoration	 and	 its	
principles»	 (Hoeniger	 2009,	 101).	 But	 documentation	 does	 not	
only	provide	a	record	of	the	decision-making	process	on	the	part	
of	conservators	so	that	future	custodians	can	reverse	the	process,	
it	 also	 sketches	 the	 trajectory	 of	 the	 artwork	 toward	 one	 or	 the	
other	vectors	of	the	diagram,	thus	‘mapping’	its	authenticity.		
Authenticity	 thus	becomes	 a	 function	 of	 the	«accuracy	with	
which	the	present	cultural	apparatus	plots	an	object	and	provides	
a	 full	 commentary	 on	 how	 its	 particular	 interpretation	 relates	 to	
that	of	its	predecessors»	(Kemp	2009,	65)	and	can	be	redefined	in	
this	 sense	 as	 a	 complex	 notion	 that	 refutes	 by	 essence	 either/or 
polarizations	around	the	notions	of	true/false,	genuine/deceptive,	
original/fake.	 If	 we	 treat	 authenticity	 as	 a	 black-or-white	 affair,	
then	 we	are	again	 pushed	back	 to	 the	 diatribe	 between	 integral-
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ists	 and	 purists,	 Thorvaldsen	 and	 Canova,	 aesthetic	 and	 historic	
value,	with	no	clear	argument	for	choosing	one	or	the	other.		
	
7. Conclusions 
In	this	paper,	I	have	shown	how	affected	the	debate	about	restora-
tion	is	by	shifts	in	our	implicit	conceptions	of	the	artwork	identity	
and	authenticity.	In	fact,	it	is	also	affected	by	major	changes	in	our	
concept	 of	 culture:	 when	 prominence	 is	 given	 to	 the	 process	 ra-
ther	 than	 to	 the	 product;	 when	 symbolic	 values	 are	 preferred	 to	
material	 values;	 when	 aesthetic	 interests	 prevail	 on	 historical	
ones.	 This	 is	 part	 of	 the	 reason	 why	 examining	 the	 principles	 of	
preservation	theory	is	such	a	tough	task,	involving	parallel	discus-
sion	of	various	ideals	and	values	and	concomitant	consideration	of	
the	most	physical	and	the	most	intangible	properties	of	a	work	of	
art.	 Restorers	 need	 to	 find	 a	 happy	 medium	 between	 preserving	
each	and	every	material	feature	of	the	object	and	modify	it	to	sat-
isfy	different	 aesthetic	needs.	 Sometimes	 this	sweet	 spot	 may	be	
easy	to	find,	but	most	of	the	times	it	is	much	more	difficult	to	de-
termine,	when,	 for	 instance,	the	object	possesses	different	mean-
ings	for	different	people.	Unluckily,	there	is	no	universal	rule	that	
can	make	things	simpler.	
Philosophical	arguments	in	this	regard	may	seem	of	margin-
al	 relevance	 to	 distressed	 restorers,	 who	 must	 continue	 working	
while	 we	 philosophers	 go	 on	 talking.	 Nevertheless,	 claiming	 that	
questions	of	art	preservation	are	merely	conventional	is	inaccept-
able:	the	way	restoration	proceeds	as	a	profession	is	determined	
by	complex	ideas	about	the	ontology	and	philosophy	of	art.	In	fact,	
is	 easy	 to	 understand	 why	 such	 philosophical	 debate	 will	 and	
should	go	on.	It	will	go	on	because	restoration	work	–	when	ambi-
guously	 planned	 –	 can	 cause	 more	 damage	 than	 the	 natural	
process	 of	 deterioration.	 And	 it	 should	 go	 on	 because	 unless	 we	
believe	 these	 questions	 can	 find	 meaningful	 answers,	 conserva-
tion	and	restoration	practices	as	we	know	them	will	not	function.	
One	could	argue	that	this	is	ultimately	an	ideological	quarrel,	
the	solution	of	which	largely	depends	on	the	beliefs	informing	the	
views	of	the	parties	 involved.	 It	 is	my	contention	that	though	we	
probably	have	to	accept	the	impossibility	of	a	singular	and	objec-
tive	theory	on	the	care	and	preservation	of	works	of	art,	this	issue	
should	 excite	 rather	 than	 discourage	 widespread	 discussion.	 Ars 
longa, philosophia perennis.	
	
